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The paper notes how long-term unemployment has been replaced Ivith long-term
underemployment and examines the role of the Job Ne1111vrk in this new
environment. The paper discusses how the structure of unemployment has
changed, how the Job Network has evolved and comments on its pel:!ormance. It
is noted that the Job Nef11iork has become more and more driven by tightly
specified processes and services supported by an ever tighter compliance
regime. This business model has much in common with franchising and this
analogy is used to intelpret the observed outcomes and the concerns expressed
by providers and other interested parties. The paper concludes that there are
some inherent problems with the franchising model and suggests that less
prescriptive arrangements may be preferable.
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Introduction
In 1998 the Government abolished the Commonwealth Employment Services and
replaced it with a devolved system of private providers of employment services. This
new system, the Job Network, involved a radical change in the way in which
employment services were delivered. Already at the outset of the Job Network it was
understood that hard to place clients might be under-serviced in a private employment
service market. This was also evident from what could be observed about the operation
of the system in its early years (Dockery and Stromback, 200 J). But that was a long
time ago and much has happened in the meantime. The contractual arrangements have
been refined, the administrativ(: processes have been significantly improved, the
performance measures made more comprehensive, and the system for monitoring is
now more refined. Likewise, the private employment service industry has matured. It
has a more stable structure, a higher degree of professionalism, and has the potential to
deliver higher quality services than in the past. These developments, in conjunction with
Centre for Labour Market Research and School of Economics and financc, ("unin Univcrsity or
Technology.
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THE JOB NETWORK AND UNDEREMPLOYMENT
the strong growth in employment, should have seen a transformation in the fortunes of
job-seekers. Since the inception of the Job Network, employment has grown by over
one million persons and the growth has been palticularly large during the past three
years. It appears, however, that the most disadvantaged have not benefited from these
developments to the extent that might have been hoped. While the long-term
unemployment is at a record low, there are indications that it has been replaced by long-
term underemployment.
This paper provides an up-to-date analysis operation of the Job Network and
comments on its performance during a period of strong employment growth and falling
unemployment. The issue of particular concern is how well the Job Network is serving
the needs of its more disadvantaged customers. The paper first summarises the recent
trends in unemployment and the use of income support. Turning then to the Job
Network, it gives an overview of its operation using the limited data available. This is
followed by an analysis of the Job Network business model and how the operation of
the Job Network has evolved in recent times. This theme is further developed in the
penultimate section, which examines the views of the Job Network providers. The
concluding section summarises the main findings and draws out the implications for the
ti.lture direction of the Job Network.
2 Recent Trends in Unemployment and Use of Income Support
As the unemployment rate has now fallen below the 5% level, the fall in the number of
long-term unemployed has been even more drastic. At below 100,000 th is is the lowest
level since the late 1970s. This does not mean that unemployment is a thing of the past.
The reliance of people on income support has not dropped at anything like the same
rate. This applies to long-term income support in particular. In fact, there has been a
growing divergence between the long-term unemployed and long-term income support
recipients. Using only the latest figures (Table I), the number on long-term income
support stands at 320,000 after having been above 400,000 for most of the 1990s. This
divergence is associated with the continuing shift towards casual and part-time jobs, a
trend evident since the 1980s. One aspect of this trend is an increase in
underemployment. The ABS measure of underemployment has increased by about
100,000 persons since 1999 and now stands at 567,000 (ABS, 2005a). Half of these
persons are part-time workers actively looking for more hours. Similarly, the Centre for
Full Employment and Equity (2006) indices of underemployment show a very small
drop in underemployment in recent times. Another dimension of short-duration jobs is
'churning': the movement of people off and on income support. As pointed out by Yi-
Ping el al. (2004), "churning is an important feature of the income support system in
Australia" (ibid. p. 59). Noting that churning is mainly associated with unemployment
payments, they suggest that 'churners' are those with problems in holding onto jobs.
During the 1995-2002 period there was a small increase in the rate of churning but it is
not known whetller this trend has been reversed or has accelerated.
What is suggested by thest: figures is that notwithstanding the strong employment
growth a section of the community has been left behind. There are more jobs, fewer
people are unemployed, and even fewer are unemployed for long periods of time.
However, the jobs that many job-seekers obtain do not last long or entail too few hours
to make much difference to their tinancial situation. Long-term unemployment has been
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replaced with long-term underemployment. In consequence, large number of people
remains reliant on income support for long periods of time. The earnings they receive
from temporary and part-time jobs can only augment, but not replace, their income
support. These facts have been extensively document by ACOSS (2005a) in particular.
To capture this new reality they have also proposed a new meaSljre of long-term
unemployment, suggesting that those who have been unemployed for nine of the last
twelve months should be regarded as long-term unemployed.
TABLE I
PERSONS RECE1VING LABOUR MARKET AND RELATED PAYMENTS,
UNEMPLOYED AND UNDEREMPLOYED WORKERS






















Note: Persons on income supporl receiving labour markct related paymcnts includc rersons on New Starl
Allowance (NSA) and Youth Allowancc (YA) (othcr). Not all ofthcsc persons arcjob-scckers, i.c. obliged to
actively look for work.
Sources: DEWR, Labour Market and Rclated Payments--A Monthly Profile. Scptcmber 2006; Australian
Lahour Markct Statistics. ASS Cat. No. 6105.0, August 2006; Undcrcmployed Workers, ASS Cal No. 6265,
Scptember 2005.
Other data provide less direct evidence. The number of job-seekers (person looking
for work at some time during a year) has dropped, from 1.777 million to 1.512 million
during the 2001-2005 period (ABS 2005b). This is a rather small decrease given the
large fall in the number of unemployed persons. Those that remain job-seekers,
however, spend less time looking-the median duration has dropped from thil1een to ten
weeks-mainly a result of a fall in the long periods of job search (for the whole year).
Consistent with the large fall in long-term unemployment, there has been a large fall
(188,000) in the number of job-seekers that do not work at all during a year. Also, those
who work for some time during a year have jobs that last longer. In other words, job-
seekers spend less time looking for a job and the jobs they obtain last longer. In
particular, the number of what might be termed' Job Network jobs'-jobs lasting 13-26
weeks-has actually fallen, albeit not in proportional terms (ABS, 2005b). Much the
same picture can be gleaned from the gross flow data on movements between labour
force states, Flows in and out of unemployment have only decreased about 10%
mirroring the small drop in the number ofjob-seekers. On the other hand, the number of
persons who remain unemployed for two successive months has fallen by almost 50%,
reflecting the shorter average duration of unemployment (ABS, 2006a). Another
positive sign is that the trend towards casualisation and part-time working has at least
abated. During 2004 and 2005, full time employment grew strongly and the long
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running trend increase in the proportion In part time employment appears to have
stabilised (ABS. 2005c).
3 The Job Network
The changing structure of unemployment doubtless has a number of causes. First and
foremost, there has been a long-running trend towards casual and part-time jobs and
more' flexible' employment arrangements. In addition, Government policy, in particular
the many changes to income SUppOit arrangements may have had a role. Many of these
policy changes have atTected job seekers indirectly via the Job Network. [n addition the
operation of the Job Network may have had direct etTects. What the Job Network does,
or does not do. can have a signiticant impact on many job-seekers and the jobs they get.
The Job Network is an extensive operation that costs almost $1.5 billion per year
and impacts on the lives of more than half a million people. Notwithstanding,
information about its operation is both scant and difticult to interpret. There are only
two regular sources of information. The monthly Job Network Performance Protile
provides a small number of highly aggregated tigures. More detail is contained in the
quarterly Labour Market Performance Outcome, but this source is specifically
concerned with reporting principal outcome measures. Other data about the Job
Network are of a more incidental nature. Thus, the DEWR Annual Reports contains
mainly internal performance measures and a few selected statistics. [n addition, there
are occasional studies that measure the causal effect of the assistance given by Job
Network providers.
Jub Network Pel.formance Profile is a new regular publication first published in
2005. [t simply details the number of placements achieved by the Job Network and the
new Job Placement Organisations. In addition. placements of Intensive Support (IS)
clients into thilteen 'week-jobs' is provided.
TABLE 2




Placements of IS clients in jobs lasting thirteen weeks or more
Placements of disadvantaged IS clients in jobs lasting thirteen weeks or more





The principal source for information about the Job Network is the regular post-
programme monitoring surveys undertaken by the DEWR. These surveys have been
conducted regularly since the 1987, which means that they provide comparable data
over a long period. A sample is drawn from persons who left assistance during a twelve-
month period. They are then surveyed about their employment status three months after
the date they left. The tindings about outcomes are most commonly presented as the
proportion of positive outcomes. being in employment (full- or part-time) or engaged in
an education or training activity (Figure I). The break in the series during the




impression one of relative constancy of the proportion of positive outcomes. The only
notable exception is the increase in the positive outcomes of Intensive Assistance during
the 2000-2003 period.' This increase was a result of Intensive Assistance (lA) clients
obtaining part-time jobs to a much greater degree than previously. In the case of Job
Search Training/Support, there was a distinct increase in the level of positive outcomes
between the two sub-periods. However, since both the form in which the service was
delivered and the characteristics of persons receiving it changed, it is unclear how this
shift should be interpreted.
FIGURE 1
JOB NETWORK POSITIVE OUTCOMES, 2000-20006
0 0 0 0
'" 0 0 0 0
0_....
" +flo .. + i-
~<D






Jan 2002 Jan 2004Jan 2000
date
• IA_ISca .. JST_ISjsl
, JM JPjne 0 JM JPo
Sourcc: DEWR, Labour Markct Assistancc Outcomcs, Junc 2000 to .June 2006.
Notc: Thc figure sbow the pCI' cem of persons that bad achievcd a positive outcomc (bcing in cmploymcnt or
training) three months aftcr exiting onc of four typcs of Job Nctwork assistance. There is a break in the data
during the 2003-2004 period and the terminology for the various types of assistance changed as the new
contracting arrangcmcnts CllJllC into cffcct in .June 2003. In the graph, similar pre-and post 2003 assistance is
combined according to thc following kcy:
IA_ISca-lntensive Assistance / IS Customised Assistance.
.1ST_ISjst-Job Search Training / IS Job Search Training.
JM_JPjne--.Job Matching / Job Placement (Job Network eligible).
JM_.JPo-.Job Matching / Job Placemcnt (other-ineligible for the full Job Network services).
If the proportion of positive outcomes is taken as the principal indicator of the
performance of the Job Network, which is commonly the case, these figures are
disappointing. During the period covered by Figure I, employment has increased by
more than a million persons and unemployment has fallen by 250,000, yet there has
been no significant improvement in the measured outcomes. It is also fair to say that the
proportion of positive outcomes gives an exalted view of the situation. Less than one
third of the positive outcomes for fA (Customised Assistance) clients are full-time jobs.
Prior to .June 2003 the term IA was used to reter to persons who were offercd personal support to find a
job. During 2003, this IeI'm was replaccd by IS, but to complicate matters IS can takc two forms. In thc
first instance only job search training is provided and in a second stage, customised assistance.
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Not too much should be read of this lack of improvement, however. Although the
survey is designed to measure outcomes, the continued insistence of DEWR to measure
outcomes by reference to the date of exiting the Job Network makes the figures difticult
to interpret. In the case of IS, an 'exit' can take one of two forms; being placed in ajob
or having participated for 12, 24 or 36 months. Those that reach these time Iimits are
deemed to have exited at that time to avoid overstating the outcomes. If the only reason
people exit is because they got a job, the data tell us how long these jobs last. More
speci fically, the proportion ofjobs lasts for thirteen weeks or more. On the other hand, if
nobody exits to a job, but all persons who exit are deemed to do so because they have
been on the books for a certain length of time, then the data tell us the proportion of
long-term clients who have got a job. In other words, depending on the category in
question the data retlect the duration of Job Network jobs, the proportion that got a job,
or some combination of the two. This ambiguity makes the data difficult to interpret. In
addition, the positive outcome measure is silent about an important dimension of
performance-the time it takes to place people in jobs.
FIGURE 2












Note: Job Search Support is the normal (mtry point to the Job Network but parents with a dependent child
enter via Employment preparation. Job-seekers c1assitied as disadvantaged enter IS Customised Assistanee
directly.





Apart from the outcomes, the LMAO details the number of commencements into
and exits from the Job Network. From these data one can derive an approximate picture
of the flows of persons through the Job Network. A schematic picture of the flows is
given in Figure 2. During recent years about 500,000 persons entered the Job Network
via Job Search Support (.ISS) during a twelve-month period. Of these, about 100,000 are
placed in jobs while on .ISS and are thus counted as exits from .ISS. Of the remainder,
380,000 commence IS, in the first instance IS Job Search Training (IS.lST). The 20,000
who do not exit .ISS or move on to IS.lST presumably comprise persons not eligible for
the full Job Network services. The progress of those who begin IS is more difficult to
track in the data. About 150,000 are recorded as exiting Intensive Support Job Search
Training: Job SUPPOlt Search (lS.lST.lSS) of which some are placed in jobs while other
exit IS.lSS only to enter Intensive SUPPOIt Customised Assistance (ISCA). However,
what happens while on ISCA cannot be inferred from the data as many persons exit
more than once for the reason explained above.
TABLE 3
SUMMARY OF LABOUR MARKET ASSISTANCE OUTCOMES FOR JOB SEEKERS





























(b) Number of persons
Outcome (number of persons) Exits (number of
persons)
Employed Unemployed Not in the Labour Further
Force Assistance
260,9R9 167,472 49,144 14,3 13 477,129
Employed full- Employed pnrt- Educntion nnd Positive
time time training outcomes
13R,844 122,145 52,961' 292,003 477,129
Source: DEWR, La!>olll" Mal"kel Assis/(lI1c£, OIlICIJIlIe.\', )'£'1I1" E//(Iillg .JIIII£' 201M,
Notes: Outcome is the status of a person who has exited or is deemed to have exited the Job Nelwork three
months alier exit. The percentage figures in Pari (a) sum to more than I(JO'X, heeause more than one type or
outcomc has bcen recorded for soml: persons, For the same reason. in Parl (b) thc sum oflhe number of
persons in each category is larger Ihan the number or exits.
Confusing as this picture may be, any attempt to read anything more from the
figures is hampered by the multiple reasons for exits. Table 3, Part (a) gives the
condensed figures for IS outcomes for the twelve-month period ending June 2006. From
these percentages and the number of exits one can then derive the corresponding
number of persons for each type of outcome given in Part (b) of the table. This
calculation reveals that 260,989 of the IS exits were in employment three months after
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they exited or were deemed to have exited. But this number is some RO,OOO larger than
the 181,800 IS clients placed in jobs according to Table I. Of course, there may be a
number of reasons why the two tigures differ. For example, many IS clients would have
found jobs themselves and thus were not 'placed' by a Job Network provider.
The ambiguity is not resolved by reference to other sources of data. The ABS data
on job search experience estimate:; that 427, I00 ofjob seekers (persons unemployed at a
point in time or having begun a job in the last twelve months were registered with a Job
Network provider (ABS, 2005b). This tigure is distinctly lower than the 500,000 quoted
above, but at least of the same order of magnitude. On the other hand, the ABS data
suggest that the Job Network plays a much smaller role in placing people in jobs than
suggested by the Job Network data. The ABS estimates that about 1.5 million persons
begun ajob in the previous twelve months. Of these, 191,600 had been registered with a
Job Network provider who might also have 'placed' them in the job (ABS, 2005b). The
Job Network data puts the tigure of at least 281,800 (181,800 IS placements lasting
thirteen weeks or more plus the InO,GOO from JSS). This is a much larger di fference and
difticult to account for. To make matters worse, the ABS tigure includes persons who
found ajob themselves so the ditference to be explained is really larger.
TABLE 4
IS PAID OUTCO,VlE DATA FOR FOURTEEN EMPLOYMENT SERVICES AREAS























Number of clients with at least one outcome payment
Number of clients starting IS
Source: Catholic Social Services Australia (2006). Attachment 3.
Notes: Providers arc paid an interim payment when they have placed a person in a job that lasts for thirteen
weeks. A Ilnal payment is rel:civcd if the job last for an additional thirteen wceks. i.e. for twenty-six wecks.
Thc amount paid depends on a job seeker's I:haral:tcristics (mainly unemploymcnt duration) and th.: rcduction
in their inl:ome support paymcnts. II' inl:omc support paymcnts cease eompletcly providers receive thc full
payment. Ifthc rcduction in inl:omc support is hetwecn 70 and 100% they are paid an intcl"lllediate paymcnt.
As is evident from the above, it is difficult to obtain a clear picture of the operation
of the Job Netwoi'k from publicly available data. The problem is not the lack of data.
The Job Network IT system is state-of-the art and provides real time information on all
job-seekers. The problem is the restricted access. This is a problem that providers
themselves also tace, but at least they have access to the aggregate data for the
Employment Services Area (ESA) in which they operate. These tigures are not publicly
available, but some summary data have been made available for the fourteen ESAs in
which Centacare operates (Table 4). According to these tigures, IS placements in
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thirteen week jobs are about 28(Vo of the number of st3l1s. For the Job Network as a
whole the figure in Table 3 above was given as 50%. Of course the figures in Table 4
are based on p3l1ial figures--the fourteen ESAs only account for about 20% of the Job
Network. Still, as with the other comparisons that have been made between ditferent
measures, this ditference is equally difficult to account for.
Since it is difficult to get a handle on the operation of the Job Network in general, it
is not surprising that the data have even less to say about the details. The transformation
of unemployment into underemployment directs our attention to the duration and
weekly hours of Job Network jobs. About three million clients have been through IS or
Intensive Assistance since the start of the Job Network. These clients cannot possibly be
different persons. There must be a fair degree of churning through the system but the
extent of this is not known. One reason for this is that only jobs that last at least thirteen
weeks are recorded. About these jobs we know that two-thirds lasts another thil1een
weeks (the ratio of final to interim outcomes in Table 4). Part-time jobs, which fall
under the 'intermediate' heading, tend to have a shorter duration. This information is
only available for the longer duration category since there is no final payment for those
with shorter duration. As regards weekly hours the LMAO data (Table 3) indicate that
about half o(the jobs are full-time. This prop0l1ion was lower in the past, so at least the
incidence of full-time jobs has increased. However, the partial tigures in Table 4 give a
quite different impression about the full- and paJ1-time proportions. As most outcomes
qualify for a full rather than intermediate payment, the suggestion is that most payable
outcomes are full-time jobs.
4 The Job Network Business Model
As the data in the previous section indicate, the Job Network has assisted large number
of job-seekers into jobs. By doing so it has no doubt contributed to a lower
unemployment rate and a much reduced number of long-term unemployed. But the
emerging long-term underemployment suggests that it has been less successful in
placing job-seekers in sustainable jobs. On that issue, the data are largely silent. Even
the most rudimentary facts, such as the nature and duration of Job Network jobs, are
clouded by ambiguities. The remainder of the paper draws on other information about
the operation of the Job Network that might explain why the jobs may not have been as
sustainable as one might wish.
The recent direction of the Job Network is best gauged by reference to the two
broad policy initiatives Active Participation and Welfare to Work.
Under the Active PaJ1icipation Madej, the model that underpinned the Job Network
contracts for the 2003-2006 period the emphasis was two-fold. The first was a detailed
specification of what the provider should do at each stage in the process of assisting a
job seeker. The second was to ensure the active engagement by job seekers by providers
having regular contact with them. Thus the contract included a long list of things to do.
Examples include to "engage the job seeker in work preparation activity ... " to "meet
with the job seeker at times specified in Clause 4.7(1') for an average total of 10.5 hours
..." and to "monitor the job seekers activities to ensure the job seeker is actively
pm1icipating ... -, (DEWR, 2005a, p. 119). The detailed specification of the services to
be delivered is here integrated with the com.pliance requirements. In other words.
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compliance was to be attained by the regular contact that a large number of discrete
services necessitate.
Under the Welfare-to-Work changes that came into effect in July 2006 the
compliance thrust was more explicit. As stated, the objective was to ensure that job
seekers who fail to meet their participation requirements are quickly re-engaged. Thus
the breach penalties were revised from a propottionate reduction in payments to a two-
stage regime. For minor breaches the next payment became contingent on compliance
while for more serious breaches an eight-week non-payment penalty was introduced. In
addition, the requirements on the provider to monitor the job-seeker were made more
onerous.
Since the contractual arrangements are extensive and couched in a formidable
language, one example has to suftice. [n the 2003-2006 contracting period a wage
subsidy scheme, 'Wage Assist', was introduced as the final option for the very hard-to-
place job-seekers. But even for a tinal option its use is highly circumscribed and the
tender document contains many warnings and conditions. Some examples are:
"Providers will need to target their use of Wage Assist carefully"; "[T]he use will be
closely monitored" and "[F]unds will not be paid unless a qualifying job lasts thirteen
consecutive weeks" (DEWR, 2005a, p. 120). Even if one accepts that the spending of
taxpayers' moneys should be subject to restraint, the conditions seem overly restrictive.
The 'Wage Assist' subsidy is hardly a blank cheque to be claimed by anybody. It is a last
resort. To be eligible, a person must have completed two periods on IACA, meaning that
all other attempts to place the person in a job have been exhausted. [n addition, only a
small number of places (about 5,(100) are provided for.
'Wage Assist' is also coupled with a harsh compliance regime and, having
exhausted the forms of assistance provided so far, the choices are stark. If someone
cannot get a 'Wage Assist' job, he or she will normally be referred to the full-time
'Work for the Dole' programme where they remain until they find paid work or take up
education and training. In the intricate flow-chart that sets out the 'Business Model for
the Very Long Term Unemployed', the 'Work for the Dole' is indeed the end of the line
(DEWR, 2006a, p. 3). The only escape from a life on 'Work for' the Dole' is a 'Job
Capacity Assessment' that might identify non-vocational batTiers to employment and,
possibly, assistance to overcome those barriers.
.Whether this' Business Model' is the best model to use in assisting the very long-
term unemployed is questionable. As regards the activation and compliance thrust, the
emerging long-term underemployment is hardly a result of job-seeker inactivity. On the
contrary, job-seekers must be getting jobs, but the problem is that those jobs do not last
long or entail only a few hours. There is nothing to suggest that people voluntarily quit
their jobs or shun full-time jobs. One can also question the factual basis for this thrust.
No comprehensive analysis of non-compliance has been undertaken. The limited data
suggest that non-compliance might be an issue for certain groups. Youth and indigenous
persons, for exaniple, account for no less than 63% of all patticipation failures (DEWR,
2006b).2 To deal with this, targeted policies directed at these groups would be a more
appropriate response.
With the passing orth~ 'Wcll(u'e to Work'!t:gislation in 2006 th~ t~rl11 participation l(lilur~ is now us~d to
dcscrib~ job-scd<crs 11011-col11plianc~ with their obligations. Tht: 1110st C0l111110n participation 1(lilur~ is not
attending an il1lt:rvi~w with a Job Network (or equivalent) provid~r.
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The new Business Model also sits uneasily with the original conception of the .Job
Network. The intention was to develop a market for employment services in which the
Government was the regulator and purchaser. This market was to be characterised by
four features: contestability, local competition, performance based funding, and
flexibility (DEWR, 2000). Instead of the old system that "relied on volumes of highly
prescriptive guidelines" (ibid., p. 23), the Government envisaged a system in which
providers had a far greater degree of flexibility in the type of services they delivered and
how they delivered them. Contestability, competition, and performance-based funding
were to ensure that services were efticient, effective, and of high quality, so that there
would be little need for the purchaser to closely prescribe how the service was
delivered. In addition, in this flexible system "the Government expected providers to
pursue more innovative solutions to problems faced by job seekers in securing
employment" (ibid., p. 23).
What has evolved is indeed a market for employment services, but in several
respects the arrangements do not correspond to what was originally envisaged. While
individual providers do decide how to best assist job-seekers, their choices are heavily
circumscribed by volumes of prescriptive guidelines. In addition, it was never
contemplated that the Job Network should be driven by ever increasing activity and
compliance requirements. The new business model that has emerged is best
characterised as a franchis(~ model. The .Job Network has become 'The McNetwork',
having many of the features common to franchising.
During the past decades, franchising has become a dominant arrangement for
supplying a standardised product in many locations. The first feature of franchising, and
this is the dominant rationale, is the use of mass marketing methods to achieve
economies of scale. Second, the quality of the product is maintained primarily by a
prescriptive specification of what is to be delivered, closely monitored by the franchisor.
This is to prevent individual franchisees from free-riding on the brand name. Third, cost
elliciency is attained by the strong economic incentives inherent in the franchisee being
the residual claimant.
All these features now characterise the .Job Network. First and foremost, the Job
Network has come to rely on a prescriptive specification of the service that providers
should deliver, rather than allowing individual providers to develop the most effective
forms of assistance in the community in which they operate. A strong compliance
regime ensures that job-seekers avail themselves of the services that are offered and the
providers face strong financial incentives to deliver payable outcomes.
This analogy should not necessarily be seen as derogatory. Although franchising is
often associated with the fast food industry, it is a very common, and in many cases the
dominant, business model in the retail industry. That this model can deliver value at low
cost in dispersed locations is beyond doubt. To that extent, it is appropriate that the .Job
Network arrangements should gravitate towards this model. But franchising works
because the products and processes that are replicated by franchisees have been
developed and refined over a period of time and have proved to meet the requirements
of the marketplace. This does not apply to the .Job Network. The 'work first' approach
inherent in the model may well be appropriate for the majority ofjob-seekers. But m,my
of the more disadvantaged job-seekers face a combination of vocational and non-
vocational barriers. The list of the latter type of barriers is particularly long and includes
mental illness, homelessness, and drug and alcohol problems. Many in the welfare
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sector argue that a 'life first' approach (Smith, 2006), assistance to deal with the barriers
combined with training and work experience, is the best way to assist these persons
(Temby et aI., 2004; Horn and Jordan, 2006). But the strong ~inancial incentives to
deliver payable outcomes inherent in the ~I'anchise model means that there is little room
for providers to develop services that might better meet the needs of the most
disadvantaged job-seekers. As a DEWR report states: "Successful providers were very
focused on overall Job Network KPls (key pedormance indicators) ... which were
aligned heavily with Star Ratings" (DEWR, 2006c, p. 60). And to reinforce the
message, these focused providers "are not distracted by other (than getting a job) needs
of clients" (ibid., p. 59). These needs are not necessarily taken care of by simply getting
people into jobs. With the barriers intact, many of the long-term unemployed ~ind it
di f~icult to hold on to jobs and become prone to being recycled through the .lob
Network. Thus, their long-term unemployment is transformed into long-term
underempIoyment.
5 The Job Network Providers
The Job Network industry now comprises just over a hundred providers operating in
1,000 locations. By and large, the providers have not played a highly visible role in the
evolution of the Job Network. Thus, main role of the industry association (the National
Employment Services Association) is to represent the industry to the DEWR, but this
role is not conducted in the public arena. In addition, it has an important function in
developing the capacity of the industry to meet the needs of its diverse clients. This
includes an active programme of professional development. But like most industry
bodies, it is mainly concerned with operational issues. It does not normally get involved
in matters of policy and public comments tend to be restrained. As regards the service
prescription, it appears to be agreeable, although they have concerns about the
implications-the resulting administrative overload (National Employment Services
Association, 2006a). It is also in broad agreement with the more stringent compliance
thrust, "acknowledging the need for a fair and firm compliance regime" (National
E,:nployment Services Association, 2006b, p. 7).
The peak body of the community employment services organisations, Jobs
Australia, has a more prominent public profile. It sees itself as not just representing the
interests of its member organisations, but also being an active participant in the policy
debate and an advocate for just and equitable outcomes. But like NESA it has to work
within the system, rather than challenge it. Thus, rather than questioning the 'work ~irst'
approach, it works to convince the Govetl1ment that more resources need to be devoted
to programmes that can help reduce the barriers that have to be overcome before job
search is a realistic option (Jobs Australia, 2006).
Not bound by organisational constraints, the front-line staff in the .lob Network are
probably more likely to provide the unadorned truth. When Jobs Australia discovered
that front-line statT were dissatisfied with many aspects of the services they delivered,
they were sufticiently concerned to undertake a survey in conjunction with the
Brotherhood of St Lawrence. While no less than 85% thought that the Job Network was
'good to excellent' in assisting people into employment these positive attitudes do not
carryover to all aspects of the Job Network. When the question referred to sustainable




Network was only 'poor to fair'. This discrepancy can be traced to the belief that there
is an excessive focus on thirteen-week jobs. As regards the Job Network's effectiveness
for specific groups, such as highly disadvantaged job seekers, 40% ranked the service as
poor to fair. The 'poor to fair' rating were even more prevalent for the 'new' client
groups: people with disability and single parents (Jobs Australia and Brotherhood of St
Laurence, 2005).
The reasons for this rather untlattering view of the services they themselves provide
can be traced to the two features of the Job Network to which attention has been drawn.
As the Job Network system has evolved, it has become more and more driven by service
obligations and easily measurable performance indicators. It has also been given a
stronger compliance role. In consequence, staff feel overburdened by administrative
requirements to process people through the system and to monitor their compliance with
an increasing array of requirements. They feel that too much time taken up with system-
driven activities that are not very helpful to job-seekers. These activities include auto-
matching, vocational profiling, two monthly interviews and 'Work for the Dole'
placement. 'Work for the Dole', in particular, has a very low standing among the front-
line staff. Few believe that it enhances job prospects, and it is not seen as having much
relevance to the broader labour market. In contrast, too few resources are devoted to
activities that are judged to be more helpful in getting people into jobs, and sustainable
jobs in pmticular. These include job-seeker accounts, wage subsidies, personal support,
including post-placement support, and vocational training.
The potential consequences of this can be clarified by reference to the use of job-
seeker accounts. This scheme was introduced in the contracting period beginning in July
2003. As a job-seeker progresses through the various stages and an account is credited
with money that the Job Network provider can use to subsidise the wage or spend on job
related training, transport, clothing, tools and equipment for work. The latent need for
investing in job-seekers is evident from the relatively large amounts paid out. In the
three years 2003-2004 to 2005-2006 JSA expenditures were $117, $278, and $196
millions, respectively (DEWR, 2006<:). These are large sums, amounting to about 20%
of. Job Network expenditures in recent years. The Job-seeker accounts have received
glowing endorsement by an internal evaluation (DEWR, 2006c). This endorsement is
repeated in the DEWR Annual RepOits (see for example DEWR, 2005b).
Notwithstanding, more restrictive guidelines on the use of the funds were introduced in
March 2005, apparently in a bid to reign in expenditure. Thus, while everybody agrees
that the scheme makes a difference, the system responds by allocating less money to it.
As regards the compliance issue" front-line staff were in two minds. In nominating
the most significant barriers to employment, one of the most common responses was the
poor attitudes and lack of motivation of many job-seekers. But recognising that attitude
and motivation are problems does not imply support for a tight compliance regime.
Some felt that a more compliance-orientated approach was needed, in line with the
ofticial view and "the thrust of Government policy. Others, however, thought that these
problems were best dealt with by an engagement-orientated approach---to develop a
supportive relationship with job-seekers to modify attitudes and build self-esteem and
motivation.
Recently, the simmering concerns in the industry have been given a more forceful
expression by Catholic Social Services Australia (CSSA). CSSA participates in the Job
Network as Centacare Employment and operates eighteen sites in tifteen employment
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services areas. As such, it is one of the largest .lob Network providers. Based on an
extensive analysis of data for the 2003-2006 contract period they raise a number of
concerns about the operation of the .lob Network. At the core of the problem is the
incentives structure that drives the behaviour of providers. This incentive structure, it is
argued, is both limiting and has 'perverse' effects. In turn, this has adverse effects on
providers and job seekers alike. It impairs the financial viability of providers who are
unwilling to 'play the system'. It also has an adverse impact on the services that job-
seekers, particularly those who are disadvantaged, receive.
Four 'perverse' effects of the incentive structure are singled out: 'short-term
parking', 'outcome buying', 'outcome manipulation', and 'sh0l1-duration placement'
(Catholic Social Services Commission 2006). Short-term parking, refers to the practice
of delaying to place job seekers in jobs in order to secure a higher fee when the job
seeker moves into a higher unemployment duration category. 'Outcome buying' is the
improper or excessive use of Job Seeker Account funds to subsidise wages in jobs that
otherwise would not exist. 'Outcome manipulation' is the placement of job seekers in
pat1-time jobs that are then upgraded to full-time to claim an additional payment.
Finally, 'short-duration placement', as implied by the label, is the placement of job
seekers into jobs that are 1101 expected to last for very long
This is, in fact, a long list of sharp practices. No doubt they all exist to a degree. But
by their very nature the extent of such practices is difficult to document and most of the
evidence that CSSA can provide is anecdotal. In case of using wage subsidies to buy
outcomes, the selected hard facts suggest otherwise. Less than 10% of job seekers
receive a wage subsidy, the amount they receive is on average 20%, the thirteen-week
outcome rate is 60% and the conversion rate (the propol1ion that remain in a job for
twenty-six weeks) is close to 100%.3 But only the DEWR is in possession of the full
facts, making it very difficult for others to substantiate their concerns.
The claim that the incentive structure is limiting, meaning that providers are only
rewarded for placing job-seekers in jobs, is on more cel1ain ground. Providers are paid a
service fee and a payment for outcomes, where an outcome is a placement in a job that
last for at least thirteen weeks. Other dimensions of the providers' service do not count.
Thus the speed of placement and the quality of the job, except to the extent that it is
reflected in the duration of the job, are not rewarded. Other dimensions of quality, pay,
hours, the nature of the work, or the match between the job and the job seekers'
aspirations do not count either. Nor are providers rewarded for getting job seekers 'job
ready' or assisting clients with the many personal problems that prevent them from
finding and holding on to jobs. .In fact, the term 'job ready' seems to have disappeared
from the .lob Network terminology.
In summary, the CSSA presents a rather grim picture of the situation. As a direct
result of the sharp practice:s of some, other providers are being pushed towards the
margin of what is ethical and responsible towards job-seekers. The consequence is that
providers who follow a service model that tries to get the best result for job-seekers
risks becoming unviable. Even though the hard evidence is not convincing, the views of
such a prominent operator must be taken seriously and should be a cause of great
These figures were provided by DEWR to the Senate Budget Estimates hearings in May 2006 and are
reproduced in CaTholic Social Services Commission 2{){)(', p. 33.
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concern. The non-profit/colllmunity sector has made a significant contribution to the .lob
Network and it would be a great loss if this contribution were to diminish.
To interpret these observations it is useful to set them in the context of franchise
business model developed in the previous section. As was pointed out, franchising is
subject to an inherent quality problem whereby franchisees seek to lower their costs by
providing a sub-standard product or service. In the .lob Network, some providers 'play
the system' to increase revenue. By doing so they provide a sub-standard service, so
there is a sense in which the effect is the same. In addition, in both cases quality shading
is controlled by monitoring combined with financial penalties. However, the underlying
causes differ. In case of franchising the underlying problem is free-riding, the fact that
individual franchisees do not carry the whole cost of the lower quality that they provide.
But free-riding is not an issue in the .lob Network. Although the sharp practices of some
adversely impact on the system as a whole, much of the demand for .lob Network
services is driven by compliance requirements rather than job-seekers' assessments of
the value of service. Instead, the sharp practices seem to be a consequence of the
limiting incentive structure. If all dimensions of the service could be measured and
rewarded at the appropriate rate, there would be no way to 'play the system', and no
need to monitor providers. But monitored they are. Indeed, by the standards of franchise
systems the monitoring is intense. Reference has already been made to the almost
universal complaint about administrative overload. A more direct indicator is that
around 1,200 DEWR staff oversee about 1,100 Job Network site (Catholic Social
Service Australia, p. 20). It is as if every manager of a Job Network site has his or her
own personal monitor.
This perspective also suggests where the solution may be found. Evidently, more
intense monitoring of providers is not the answer. At the hem1 of the problem is the
limiting incentive structure that reward providers for a sub-set of the services they
provide. Among providers there is a strong sense that too much weight is given to
thirteen-week jobs. However, the incentive structure is quite complex, and in practice it
is not obvious how to improve on the existing situation. Recognising this, and the fact
that many dimensions of the service are difficult measure, it may be that a less intense
incentive structure would be preferable. This would be consistent with the standard
principal-agent model, which implies that the optimal incentive intensity of a contract
is lower when the desired outcomes are poorly measured (see e.g. Milgrom and Roberts,
1992, p. 221 ).
6 Conclusions
While the Job Network has contributed to the decline in long-term unemployment, it has
not prevented the emergence of long-term underemployment. Indeed its operation may
well have contributed to this emerging phenomenon. As the Job Network has evolved, it
has become characterised by three features: a tight specification for processes to be
followed and services to be delivered; job-seekers being subjected to ever tighter
activation and compliance requirements; and providers being driven by strong financial
incentives. This business model has much in common with franchising and this analogy
is useful to conceptualise how the .lob Network operates.
Several indicators suggest that there are inherent problems with this business
model. The number of persons on long-term income support remains high; there has
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been no decl ine in the number of persons on IS, and long-term under-employment has
increased. There is also a growing concern from within the .lob Network of an excessive
concern with immediate and easi Iy measurable outcomes. Perhaps the most concrete
concerns are expressed by the .lob Network front-line statT. They are overburdened by
administrative work to meet the process, service, and compliance requirements, and are
frustrated by their lack of discretion and access to effective resources to deal with the
barriers that many job-seekers face. The consequence of this is that the long-term
unemployed may be placed in jobs that they cannot hold and end up being recycled
between short-term jobs. In other words, long-term unemployment is transformed into
long-term underemployment.
Similar concerns have been expressed in the recent literature based on other
perspectives. Marston and McDonald (2006) draw attention to how the human service
function of the .lob Network is compromised by the organisational structure of the Job
Network with its emphasis on processes, products and outcomes. In a similar vein,
Smith (2006) has reservations with the 'work first' approach and points to the evidence
that suggests that this approach is not appropriate to deal with the barriers that many of
the long-term unemployed face.
The main alternative to the current franchise model is a less prescriptive contract
that gives greater discretion to providers. This would need to be accompanied by more
broadly based performance indicators. The capacity to adapt to changing requirements
is also an impol1ant design consideration. During the last few years, the structure of
unemployment has changed significantly and with it the operation of the Job Network.
Easy-to-place persons are now in jobs and the Job Network has to deal with the backlog
of the hard-to-place and those brought into the system by the more stringent compliance
regime. In addition, it has to service two additional client groups: single parents and
disabled persons. Using the franchise analogy again, we know that this business model
is not unresponsive to change; but that is not its greatest strength.
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